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I. Introduction
{1} Digital Property and the Digital Marketplace Expenditures in the information technology arena indicate
that digital property - defined as digitized information and the tools to use it - is generating astonishing
wealth. Globally, expenditures in the information and communication technology markets exceed $1.8 trillion
annually and comprise six percent (6%) of aggregate global Gross Domestic Product ("GDP").[1] By 1997,
such expenditures had escalated forty percent (40%) over 1992 levels.[2] Current spending on information
and communication technologies is growing twenty-seven percent (27%) faster than the overall worldwide
GDP, averaging roughly 5.5 percent annually.[3] Technological innovations have become the primary engine
of economic growth. For example, according to a 1997 government report, the technology market accounted
for seventy-six percent (76%) of economic growth in France, seventy-eight percent (78%) in Germany,
seventy-three percent (73%) in the United Kingdom, and fifty-five percent (55%) in Japan.[4]
{2} In the United States, investment in information technology grew from $55 billion to $190 billion during
the 1980's, an annual growth rate of just under fifteen percent (15%).[5] By 1997, the United States was
spending roughly $643 billion annually on information and communication technologies.[6] As of that same
year, information technology industries accounted for an estimated 7.8 percent (7.8%) of U.S. GDP and 12.4
percent (12.4%) of its nominal growth, while for 1998 the preliminary comparable figures are 8.2 percent
(8.2%) and 14.7 percent (14.7%).[7] In 1995, information technology's share of all research and development
spending in the U.S. was 43.7 percent (43.7%) and rising,[8] and by 2000, business spending on information
technology equipment should exceed half of all spending on capital equipment.[9]
{3} Much of the investment in information technology is directly related to the growth of the Internet.
Between 1996 and 1998, Internet utilization grew from forty (40) to 100 million people.[10] Forecasters
speculate that Internet use will escalate to 320 million people by 2002, [11] when Internet use for commerce
between businesses alone may amount to $300 billion. [12] Use of the Internet for delivery of goods and
services and the retail sales of tangible items is also on the rise, and if the current trend continues,
"information technology and electronic commerce can be expected to drive economic growth for many years
to come." [13] Cost savings, increased consumer choice, and improved customer convenience are stimulating
the expansion of the Internet retail sector. Advances in information and communications technologies have
significantly improved the ease with which products or art forms can be created, reproduced, and
disseminated. Trade on the Internet is thus equally attractive to consumers and suppliers. For the former, it is
fast and convenient; for the latter, it reduces overhead costs at every stage, from production through sale and
delivery.
{4} Despite this unprecedented growth, many observers see problems ahead. Issues such as proprietary
rights, access, accuracy, privacy, confidentiality, responsibility, and equity pose challenges to the future scope
and direction of the digital era. This paper focuses on one concrete problem that brings many of these issues

into especially sharp focus: the appropriate scope of proprietary rights in databases. The problem implicates,
among other things, the structure of the digital marketplace, the nature of digital property, the current and
future state of the law of intellectual property, and the sometimes conflicting demands for economic
incentives to both intellectual creativity and the universal dissemination of knowledge. [14] Universal access
to knowledge is the greatest benefit of the digital economy. Once digitized, any piece of information or any
author's work can be made available to anyone, anywhere, at anytime. But the concept of universal
accessibility challenges some of the foundational premises of intellectual property protection. As a result of
the ease with which digital property can be modified, copied, and distributed, longstanding legal and practical
assumptions about protecting ownership, guaranteeing authenticity, and balancing the rights of owners and
users may no longer apply.
{5} In a market-based economy, products are assumed to be valued at their true worth when four conditions
are met. [15] First, the marketplace must be competitive. In addition, the product, whether a good or service,
must manifest transparency, exclusivity, and rivalry. Competition is that state in which producers, driven by
fear of their competitors, work diligently to keep prices as low as possible while avoiding over-production. In
a perfectly competitive marketplace, goods are priced at their true value, and production and consumption are
in equilibrium. Historically, the absence of government intervention has been assumed to be the most
effective guarantor of competition, [16] leaving the task to Adam Smith's "invisible hand." [17] When
markets have exhibited such characteristics as unusual barriers to entry or susceptibility to collusion,
government intervention in the form of antitrust legislation has been necessary. [18] Governments have, of
course, often intervened directly to support particular activities and enterprises.
{6} Whereas competition is a general attribute of the marketplace, transparency, exclusivity, and rivalry are
attributes of particular products. [19] Transparency refers to the ability of the consumer to understand fully
the value of the good or service prior to purchase. When goods or services are transparent, their value is
known in advance, allowing consumers to make a rational choice as to whether the product is worth the
purchase price. Few goods or services are inherently transparent, prompting government intervention in the
form of trademark, truth-in advertising, and unfair trade practice laws. Exclusivity refers to the seller's ability
to limit or control access to the product. Traditional retail goods exhibit nearly-perfect exclusivity: the seller
uses physical dominion over the goods to control distribution, thereby limiting access to those who pay the
purchase price. Free-riding is virtually impossible. The related concept of rivalry, sometimes termed
individual consumption, assumes that one person's consumption of a product depletes the supply available for
others to use, either temporarily or permanently. Once again, retail goods are the perfect example: if I have a
particular chair in my living room, you cannot have it in yours; if I eat that loaf of bread, then you cannot.
{7} As the retail examples suggest, little or no government intervention is necessary to insure the exclusivity
and rivalry of most tangible, movable property. Real property has evoked such supports as title filing and
registration systems, but intellectual property has proved to be the most difficult case of all. Ideas, inventive
concepts, know-how, even literary texts once disclosed to anyone are inherently accessible to others.
Intellectual property is also almost totally non-rival: I can produce your play in one theater at the same time
you are producing it in another without affecting the play itself. The fundamental purpose of all intellectual
property law is to create an artificial form of exclusivity (rivalry is nearly impossible). Although I can
produce your play without having to "steal" a tangible object, the law of copyright empowers you to treat me
like a thief.
{8} Governments have been restrained, however, in their support of exclusivity. Patent and copyright
monopolies are limited in both time and scope, while the law of trade secrets is riddled with exceptions and
defenses. The guiding principle has always been balance: dole out only as much exclusivity as is necessary
"to promote the progress of science and the useful arts,"[20] but otherwise, protect the public domain.[21]
The assumption is that in the absence of the ability to exclude others from free-riding, entrepreneurs will not
take the risks necessary to develop and market new and useful products. Where "real" exclusivity is inherent

in the product itself, the government largely stands aside and lets the market take its course, unless
competitors act to suppress market forces. But where the government itself is the source of an artificial form
of exclusivity, constant vigilance is required to make sure that the discouragement of free-riding does not also
discourage the socially useful process of technological improvement.
{9} How adequately are these four conditions satisfied in the digital marketplace? First, the market appears to
be fiercely competitive. The government's suit against Microsoft suggests concern about barriers to entry and
the leveraging of market power in some sectors, but the statistics with which we began the paper are
indicative of a market with unprecedented dynamism. Thus far, monopolizing a particular product or facility
has hardly been worth the effort because technology has enabled others to leapfrog the bottleneck faster than
the legal process could break it up. With respect to transparency, digital property may be more opaque to
consumers than, say, clothes, but this is a question of degree. To most consumers, cars, and airfares are
probably as impenetrable as digital products.
{10} With respect to exclusivity, digital property presents the same basic challenges as other forms of
intellectual property, but at unprecedented levels of complexity. Like other forms of intellectual property,
digital goods can be jointly consumed without being diminished in quality or quantity, presenting the
consumer with the temptation to free-ride by exploiting them without compensation. In the case of digital
property, however, the temptation is greater by many orders of magnitude than in the instance of, say, a patent
on an industrial process or a copyrighted book. The ease with which digital property can be located, accessed,
copied, modified, and distributed is utterly without precedent. The problems involved in using intellectual
property law to create a form of artificial exclusivity that will have meaning in the real world are formidable.
[22]
{11} The exclusivity issue takes on a further layer of complexity when the digital property in question is a
database, especially one found on the Internet. Computers can, of course, archive, compare, manipulate, and
distribute data with astonishing facility. But in addition, neither data itself, nor the labor involved in
collecting, recording, and arranging it have a secure place in the current structure of intellectual property law.
The law has hesitated to extend exclusivity in these areas because of concerns about the appropriate balance
between the incentives needed to promote the creation of useful data compilations and the public's need for
free access to information. The ultimate purpose of this paper is to consider whether the digital era's
newfound ease of appropriation requires a rethinking of the current legal compromise and, if so, what form it
should take. We turn next, however, to some necessary background on the nature of databases and the
technical means available to create a measure of "real" exclusivity.

II. The Nature of Databases
{12} As is true in all emerging and evolving fields, much of the vocabulary pertaining to the digital economy
is ambiguous. As digital jargon has developed, the term "database" has taken on several definitions, covering
everything from telephone books to the World Wide Web ("WWW"). Our intellectual preference would be to
abandon "database" because of its lack of clarity and substitute "information system," which, as discussed
below, better captures the nature of the entities that are the subject of the "database" debate. However,
because the legal discourse has clung insistently to "database,"[23] we will retain it as well. This section
examines in some detail the various forms of digital property that are grouped under the database heading.
{13} A database, or information system, contains two primary forms of digital property: raw data, which can
be a source of knowledge or entertainment value, and tools, which are programs that can be used to
communicate, store, or manipulate raw data. A fully developed database is an interrelated set of components
capable of generating value from the collection, processing, merger, storage, or dissemination of data. In

practice, databases are arrayed along a continuum according to where their primary value lies. At one end are
those whose value depends on the data themselves. At the other end are those databases whose critical
element is the system for manipulating the data. Most, of course, are found somewhere in the middle.
{14} The process of extracting useful knowledge from volumes of raw data is known as knowledge
discovery. The potential economic benefits of knowledge discovery initiatives have opened new avenues for
selling raw data, digital tools, and combinations of the two. A range of businesses find the "mining" of data
economically fruitful in both producing and marketing goods and services. New patterns, trends, and
associations can be identified through the merging of vast amounts of disparate data. The use of constantly
expanding search capabilities can result in the discovery of knowledge or products that possess previously
unappreciated market value. Data which is scattered among a variety of sources can be matched, collated, and
reproduced in new formats that can give value to otherwise random facts. For example, many grocery stores
today offer discount cards to customers who will provide identifying and demographic information. The
checkout computer then creates a precise record of each individual's purchasing habits. When organized by
residence pattern, income level, etc., and distributed in a usable format, this data can be of enormous value to
a variety of retail interests. A chain thinking of opening an Italian restaurant in a particular neighborhood can
find out exactly how much the residents spend on Italian food at the grocery store. What was once low
market-value, or even useless, data - a wastebasket full of cash register receipts - has been transformed into a
marketing goldmine.
{15} Over the past several years, the market has exploded with new tools for searching, matching, collating,
updating, replicating, and distributing data. In much the same way that a builder employs many different tools
to build a house, databases can be crafted through the use of multiple tools. These tools can be bundled
together and provided as a "complete" package, or they can be subdivided to address specific tasks. The
revolution in tool technology is an obvious threat to the exclusivity of digital property. Less obviously,
because many of today's tools can easily alter data quality and integrity, they also threaten product
transparency (knowledge of the worth of the commodity prior to purchase).
{16} A now-familiar example is that category of tools often lumped under the generic heading of "Internet
search engine." In response to simple user requests, search engines can root out digital property irrespective
of geographic location. The vast "snooping" power of these engines, coupled with weaknesses in security and
detection controls, facilitates theft and allows unauthorized distribution. Additionally, advances in copying
and editing capabilities can lead to recompilations and new derivatives beyond the imagination, let alone, the
knowledge of the original owner.
{17} The popular term "search engine" actually encompasses five different categories of tools: directories,
search engines, super engines, meta search engines, and special search engines.[24] The first category,
directories, is exemplified by the WWW search tools Yahoo and Magellan. With a directory service, a search
will yield any relevant website that is registered with that directory. The site is then reviewed by employees
of the search directory, then placed in a category within the directory, and assigned a relevance ranking by the
employees.
{18} Search engines in the narrow sense, for example Lycos, Infoseek, and Webcrawler employ "spiders" to
locate sites. Spiders (also known as "robots," "bots," or "crawlers") are programs used by search engines to
locate, retrieve, index, and update new websites. The new website information is then provided in response to
search queries. Spiders follow links within webpages to continually gather more and more site information.
Once a site is indexed, it becomes available for a research request. The index usually stores keywords found
within a site's title, description, and "meta tags." Meta tags provide descriptive information about the contents
and owner of the site. Website developers can aid search engines by placing the keywords they wish to be
associated with a site within meta tags in the page's HTML (hyper text markup language). Website developers
may also register their sites with most search engines in the same way as with directories.

{19} A third search tool is the super search engine. Some examples of super search engines are Hot Bot,
Altavista, Excite, and Open Text. These super engines expand on the search engine concept by programming
their spiders to search for keywords within the text of the webpages instead of just in page titles, descriptions,
and meta tags. A fourth variety, the meta search engine (for example, Metacrawler, Dogpile, Cyber411, and
Savvy Search), allows users to employ multiple search engines or even super search engines at once.
Metacrawler, for example, allows users to search Lycos, Infoseek, Webcrawler, Excite, AltaVista,
Thunderstone, and Yahoo. Meta search engines typically do not contain a site database of their own, but
merely route requests to a variety of different engines, then compile and return the results to the requesting
party. A final class of search tool, the specialized search engine, targets specific types of information such as
Usenet newsgroups (DejaNews), phonebook listings (Infospace), and FTP (file transfer protocol) archive sites
(i.e., FTP Search). These engines are all searchable by keyword, though the actual search logic depends upon
the individual engine.
{20} The search engine concept is not limited to the Internet. In the grocery card example given earlier, the
checkout information would be "searched" by software analogous to an Internet engine, then organized and
formatted in a specified manner. Many law firms use a tool called "Goldmine" to store and organize coded
data about clients and then to manipulate the data to produce, for example, mailing lists of clients with
particular characteristics.
{21} Other information system elements may fall into a category that is intermediate between raw data and
search software. Some systems are characterized by "database relationships." In such a system, facts are
assigned to tables which are organized according to software-based rules. The data itself is not literally
organized as it would be in a paper directory, but on the other hand, the process of organization is not
dependent upon the application of an external tool.
{22} A user gathering information through any of these devices may see himself as simply using a
"database." Yet, in each case both the logic and logistics of the search will be distinctive. Depending on the
source of the data and the search tool or tools employed, different parties will be contributing to the value of
the ultimate product in radically different ways. As we shall see in the remainder of this paper, these
differences also have important implications for the application of existing intellectual property law and the
evaluation of possible change.
{23} A final background thought concerns the variety of creative processes that contribute to the
development of the hybrid entities popularly thought of as databases. These processes fall out along another
continuum whose endpoints are effort and invention. In its most rudimentary form, the process of collecting
and organizing information is a matter of raw human effort. The production of an old-fashioned database like
a telephone book falls into this category. To borrow a cliche' often used to describe science, this sort of
process is ninety-nine percent (99%) perspiration and one percent (1%) inspiration. Courts long ago
recognized this reality in developing the "sweat of the brow" doctrine to protect maps, simple directories, and
the like. [25] At the other extreme is pure invention. The label "inventive" or "creative" would clearly apply
to the development of an entirely new software tool to mine existing data resources.
{24} In the real world of databases, most things fall in the middle. Recall yet again, the example of the
grocery discount cards that are a front for market research that can then be resold.[26] The individual items of
information that are collected are straightforward. Presumably, they could have been compiled and collated in
the past through a vast amount of human sweat, with drones sorting cash register receipts. That sweat has
been replaced almost entirely by new search technology. The realization that this previously useless data now
has economic value was insightful, if not inventive, and the tools which do the work of compilation are
themselves inventive products. But how should one characterize the enterprise as a whole - that thing that is
loosely-termed a "database?"

{25} Most digital data-based products result from a combination of effort and invention. This reality gives
rise to a number of practical questions that have legal significance. Where, for example, is the boundary
between mere effort on the one hand, and invention and creativity on the other? Where does ownership
reside? Does it reside with the original collector of the data, the individual who conceived of the new
combination, the inventor of the search tools, or some combination of them? And what of the people to whom
data pertain? As more and more data goes online, as our tools become more advanced, and as digital property
becomes an ever-larger component of our collective wealth, issues like these will only become more vexing.

III. Non-Legal Solutions
{26} Lawyers who deal regularly with technology clients know of their pervasive belief that the law is slow,
outdated, and inconsistent. It is therefore, not surprising that the database industry has pressed ahead with
non-legal, technological solutions to some of the present and future problems with exclusivity, rivalry, and
transparency that we have reviewed. This section provides a brief introduction to some of the more widely
used technical measures. It is intended only as an introduction; the field is in fact, both wider and deeper than
our remarks suggest, with these and many other measures used in a bewildering array of combinations.
{27} The field of technological protection for digital property is developing very rapidly, but at the moment
the most common approaches include server and file controls, encryption, complementary keys, and digital
signatures.[27] Server and file controls restrict unauthorized access and thus enhance exclusivity, and
indirectly, rivalry.[28] Access can vary from completely uncontrolled (the full contents of the server are
available without restriction) to partially-controlled (unrestricted access is granted to only certain data on the
server) to completely controlled (no uncontrolled access in any form is permitted).[29] Access control is
effected through user identification and authentication procedures that deny server or file access to
unauthorized users. "Call back" control provides additional access security by calling back the requestor
when log on is initiated. When the user makes a connection, the server immediately terminates the connection
and reestablishes it to a location that has been previously registered and authenticated. Alternatively,
hardware key systems require the user to verify the connection by inserting a hardware device similar to a
credit card into the computer system. The device sends an indecipherable code to the server to verify the
identity of the user. Without the hardware key, data or tools on the server cannot be accessed.
{28} A second level of control over access to, and use of, digital property can be exerted through the
electronic file containing the work. "Rendering" software allows restriction at the file level. For example, a
provider can incorporate code that will control by whom, and to what extent, a protected file can be used.
Such code can also establish which rights (read, write, delete, or copy) any given individual may exercise.
{29} Various forms of encryption can promote exclusivity, by limiting access, and transparency, by
facilitating authentication, thereby enabling the user to know he is getting what he expected. Encryption
amounts to using mathematical algorithms both to "scramble" and "unscramble" the data. It is in essence a
high-tech version of the manual encoding and decoding systems familiar to readers of spy novels (for
example, move each letter five places down the alphabet, so that "A" is read as "F"). Authorization in the
form of a "decryption key" is required to decrypt the encrypted file and to restore it to its original malleable
format. In early encryption technologies, only a single key was used. The sender encrypted the message with
one key and the receiver decrypted the message with its ancillary key. The sender had one key, and every
receiver had an identical ancillary key to decrypt the message. Problems soon resulted with this method. The
stealing and changing of keys compromised, respectively, security and access. To resolve these threats, the
industry turned to a "complementary key" or "public key" system.
{30} Public key encryption requires two specific keys - a public and a private key. Each person has one

private and one public key. Any number of authorized people may know a person's public key, while each
individual's unique private key should indeed be private. Encryption is done with the public key, but
decryption can only be done with the private key. At the time of encryption, the sender encrypts the data with
the sender's public key, and sets the decryption method according to the recipient's public key, obtained from
the recipient or a directory. But without the private key of the intended recipient, the work cannot be read,
manipulated, or otherwise deciphered by other parties. Interestingly, it is at present computationally infeasible
(within thousands of years) to determine private keys from encrypted messages by brute force trial-and-error
methods. However, once a file is decrypted, if other security measures are not included, nothing prevents it
from being reproduced and redistributed.[30]
{31} Recent advances in digital signatures are also proving to offer substantial security benefits. Digital
signatures allow the receiver of a communication to authenticate the source. Digital signatures can also verify
that the original contents of the file have not been altered. By exposing fraudulent data transfers, signatures
aid in the policing of exclusivity, while the verification function enhances transparency. In one common
model, an algorithm called a "hash function" is applied to the message being sent to produce a shorter,
scrambled statement, or message digest, which becomes a fingerprint of the message. The sender then
encrypts the message digest using the complementary key system discussed above, but in reverse, with the
sender's private key used to encrypt and the public key to decrypt. The result is a digital signature. The
recipient of the message decrypts the signature and then applies the same hashing algorithm to the message to
produce another message digest. A comparison of the two message digests verifies that the message
originated from the expected sender and has not received tampering. While digital signatures use encryption
in the signature and hashing functions, they do not actually encrypt the work. But digital signatures and
encryption can be used simultaneously to optimize security. Some electronic correspondents also append
"electronic certificates" to their messages. These are issued by a mutually agreeable, trusted third party and
certify that the public key which decodes the signature is in fact, that of the presumed sender.
{32} According to a recent American Bar Association report, digital signatures offer four related advantages.
[31] First, they minimize the risk of dealing with imposters or persons who attempt to escape responsibility
by claiming to have been impersonated. Second, digital signatures minimize the risk of undetected message
tampering and forgery, and false claims that a message was altered after it was sent. Third, they are more
secure than handwritten signatures, with the threat of forgery virtually negligible. Finally, digital signatures
insure a high degree of information security, even for information sent over open, insecure, inexpensive, and
widely used channels.
{33} Despite their sophistication, self-help technological approaches like these have not eliminated the
demand for legal protections. In some contexts, they are technologically infeasible. In other situations, they
would impose a burden on existing and potential users that would be unacceptable from a business
perspective. We turn now to a review of the currently available legal protection, identifying along the way
some of the instances in which legal and extra-legal measures may interact.

IV. Legal Protection: The Current State of U.S. Law
A. The Nature of the Potentially Protectable Rights
{34} The variety of entities lumped under the heading of "database" comprise a complex array of potentially
protectible intellectual property.[32] The principal categories include the data elements themselves; the effort
used in locating them; the effort and any originality involved in selecting among and arranging the available
elements; and the tools for search and organization, together with all aspects of their creation. In this section,
we consider the available legal strategies to protect these various categories of intellectual property. As

discussed, a lack of confidence in legal protections may drive some database proprietors to use technological
means to prevent certain user activities.[33] Here, however, we assume the proprietor wishes to enable a full
range of uses and to assess the efficacy of the applicable legal strategies.
{35} The objectives of a rationally self-interested database owner will be: (1) to permit authorized persons to
use the database fully; (2) to prevent unauthorized persons from using it; and (3) to prevent competitors from
copying it in order to create a competitive product. A database owner will judge the adequacy of any form of
legal protection according to its capacity to advance these three interrelated objectives. The legal principles of
protection are the same whether the subject is a simple paper database like a telephone book or a complex
aggregation of data dispersed through cyberspace. However, the way in which those principles are applied
will be heavily dependent on the nature of the product. In particular, the appropriate focus of protection for a
given database will depend in large part on whether its creators placed primary value in the underlying data
structure or in the search and organization tools.
1. The Data Elements
{36} The intellectual property status of the data elements to be compiled is typically beyond the control of
the compiler. As a general rule, the legal status of the data elements is unaffected by the process of
compilation; the rights appurtenant to the constituent elements are passed through from compiler to end-user.
[34] The raw materials will often be in the public domain, as in the case of telephone book entries,[35] the
names of cable system operators,[36] or the statistics of Major League baseball pitchers.[37] A compilation
can also include copyrighted works, whose use would require the permission of the copyright holders. A
database might even contain trade secret material. In such a case, a law-abiding compiler would seek a
license from the trade secret proprietor. Because unrestricted dissemination of the material to innocent third
parties might vitiate its trade secret status,[38] the proprietor would presumably demand that end-users be
placed under contractual obligations of confidentiality. It is difficult to imagine circumstances in which a data
element would itself be a patented invention, the unauthorized making, using, or selling of which would
constitute infringement.[39] However, it is conceivable that the inclusion of information about a patented
invention could amount to active inducement of infringement, which is itself a form of infringement.[40]
2. The Research Effort
{37} Prior to the Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,
Inc.,[41] courts occasionally granted copyright protection for the effort involved in finding and assembling a
body of collected data. Under what came to be called the "sweat of the brow" doctrine,[42] a long line of
cases protected the "industrious collection" of a compiler, regardless of "whether the materials he has
collected consist or not of matters which are of public juris, or whether such materials show literary skill or
originality, either in thought or in language."[43] In order to avoid copyright infringement, a second user of
previously-compiled public-domain information had to make the redundant effort to root it out from the
original sources.[44] Copyright protection for a compilation thus depended on the quantity, rather than the
quality of the work done by both the original collector and subsequent users of the compiled information.
{38} Feist explicitly repudiated the "sweat of the brow" doctrine.[45] In rejecting copyright protection for a
white-pages telephone directory, the Court held that requiring subsequent users to duplicate the original
compiler's effort was exactly backwards: far from demanding redundant effort, copyright law - by denying
protection to isolated facts and ideas[46] - sought to discourage it.[47] Henceforth, copyright protection
would depend upon the quality of the compiler's work: "originality, not 'sweat of the brow', is the touchstone
of copyright protection in directories and other fact-based works."[48]
{39} The Feist Court did leave open the possibility that unoriginal effort alone might be eligible for legal
protection other than copyright.[49] Suggesting the availability of unfair competition protection, the Court

mentioned its 1918 decision (never overruled) in International News Service v. Associated Press.[50] There,
the defendant was enjoined from repackaging news items originally reported by the Associated Press and
then selling them to its own subscribers. While the Court acknowledged that the factual items that comprise
the news are not literary works eligible for copyright protection,[51] it found that the common law of unfair
competition would not allow a competitor "to reap where it has not sown."[52] Although INS was decided on
the basis of federal general common law, a category extinguished by the Court's 1938 decision in Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins,[53] a few courts have recognized non-copyright protection for facts amounting to "hot
news" in state laws of misappropriation.[54]
{40} A prospective plaintiff's enthusiasm for the INS cause of action must be tempered by the realization that
misappropriation theories that purport to prohibit copying of compiled information are usually held to be
preempted by the Copyright Act.[55] A state-law cause of action will survive preemption only if it protects
intellectual property not within the subject matter of copyright and/or asserts rights not equivalent to
copyright.[56] Cases decided under the Copyright Act of 1976 have uniformly held compilations of facts to
be within the subject matter of copyright [57] and have allowed misappropriation claims only when they
include the "extra elements" (that is, in addition to proof of copying) that were present in INS itself: the timesensitive value of the facts, free-riding by the defendant, and a threat to the existence of the plaintiff's product
or service.[58]
{41} Another avenue for protecting industrious collection is to enter into contracts with users. An agreement
with a database user might, for example, allow access only for research purposes and prohibit dissemination
of the contents to others. There are both practical and legal problems with this approach, however. On a
practical level, it is difficult to establish, police, and enforce contractual relations with users of a database that
is widely available, such as one on the Internet. The proprietor's options include demanding that users assent
to a "click-on" license, with or without user identification, as a condition to access and/or downloading
capability, and even charging for these privileges. Such steps will deter some casual abusers, and a fee will
insure some return on the proprietor's effort. But the material passes out of the proprietor's control once
downloaded, and a list of thousands of prospective shallow-pocket defendants would be of little practical
value. Moreover, the more onerous the restrictions, the more potential users are driven away, which will have
consequences for generating revenue through advertising.[59]
{42} The principal legal concerns are contract enforceability and possible copyright preemption. Presumably,
old-fashioned, face-to-face contracting will be possible only in the case of specialized users of high-end,
limited-access databases. For the majority of Internet situations, something analogous to software shrinkwrap
licenses will have to suffice. Few cases have dealt with the enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses, but in the
most recent and perhaps most authoritative of these, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,[60] the Seventh Circuit held
that a shrinkwrap license is an ordinary contract that is enforceable under the Uniform Commercial Code
("U.C.C"). Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Frank Easterbrook relied largely on the accepted economics
of the software market.[61] The court also ruled that state-law enforcement of such contracts is not
preempted by the Copyright Act. This is because a copyright, which "is a right against the world," is in no
sense "equivalent to" a contract, which binds only its parties.[62]
{43} The ProCD decision is not, however, a guaranty that contractual limits on the use of mass-marketed
databases will be uniformly enforceable. First, ProCD dealt with traditional shrinkwrap packaging for
software, and treated it is a "sale" governed by Article 2 of the U.C.C. Other courts might take a different
analytical perspective on click-on contracts intended to limit database use. Second, however persuasive its
analysis might be, ProCD is a single case applying the contract law of a single state. The status of shrinkwrap
licenses and analogous contracts is undecided in most states.[63] Finally, the ProCD court's view of
preemption is not universally shared. In 1988, in Vault Corporation v. Quaid Software, Ltd., the Fifth Circuit
held that a Louisiana statute which made shrinkwrap licenses enforceable was preempted.[64] Although Vault
has attracted little positive attention in the subsequent case law,[65] David Nimmer, who succeeded his late

father as the principal author of the influential treatise Nimmer on Copyright,[66] argues vigorously in the
current edition that ProCD was wrongly decided and that similar contractual attempts to limit database use
are preempted.[67] Nimmer's point is that Feist has declared facts to be unprotectible elements of works that
are generally within the subject matter of copyright. Therefore, any attempt to protect facts by other means
must run afoul of either Section 301 of the Copyright Act or a general theory of preemption that, he claims,
operates independent of Section 301.[68] Passing judgment on Nimmer's argument is beyond the scope of
this article. Suffice it to say that contractual protection of the research effort is not a sure thing from a legal
perspective. Even if it were, one comes inevitably back to the practical problem: with apologies to P.T.
Barnum, a million clicks of assent to a restrictive license are probably not worth the electrons by which they
are transmitted.
3. The Selection and Arrangement of the Data
{44} It is abundantly clear that legal protection for the intellectual process of selecting and arranging data in a
compilation must come, if anywhere, from copyright law. Section 103 of the Copyright Act expressly
includes within the subject matter of copyright contributions made by authors of compilations.[69] The
definitions section then sets the standard for a protectible compilation: "a work formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that
the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship."[70] A state-law attempt to protect
the process of compilation upon some lesser or different showing would amount to a "junior" copyright - an
obvious violation of Section 301.
{45} Feist, of course, is the authoritative statement of how much originality is required for copyright
purposes. In theory, the requirement is minimal: "[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright, means only that
the work was created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses some
minimal degree of creativity. . . .[T]he requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will
suffice."[71] The white-pages phonebook at issue in Feist fell well short of even this minimal standard.
Although the plaintiff might have invested substantial effort into collecting its listings, the arrangement
followed the standard alphabetical scheme, and thus involved no creativity at all.
{46} Once the "sweat of the brow" doctrine had been abrogated, Feist was an easy copyright case - too easy,
perhaps, in light of the difficulty that subsequent courts have had in applying in it. A white-pages phonebook
is perhaps the least creative compilation imaginable. Consequently, virtually every other reported compilation
case involves a stronger case for copyright protection than Feist itself. By choosing the weakest possible case
to articulate the originality standard, the Supreme Court offered no guidance to the lower courts on the
question of how much more creative than the white-pages a compilation must be in order to qualify for
copyright protection. Several recent decisions illustrate the ensuing confusion.
a. Sufficient originality found
{47} One of the first reported cases to cite Feist also involved a telephone directory. In Key Publications, Inc.
v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises, Inc,[72] the plaintiff published a directory of New York's
Chinese business community. Plaintiff Key collected business cards from business and professional people,
copied some restaurant listings from another directory, and ultimately produced a "yellow pages" that
included about 9,000 listings organized into 260 business categories. Each consisted of an English and
Chinese name, an address, and a telephone number.[73] The defendant's directory contained 2,000 listings,
1,500 of which also appeared in the Key directory, organized into twenty-eight categories, only three of
which were also used by Key.
{48} The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the Key directory was sufficiently original
to warrant copyright protection, but reversed its judgment of infringement. On the first issue, the court of

appeals agreed that the process of selection undertaken by Key's president was sufficiently creative to satisfy
Feist. It cited her initial judgment to select only those New York businesses that would be of interest to the
Chinese-American community, and her testimony that she subsequently exercised discretion in excluding
individual businesses that she thought would not remain open for very long. These acts of "thought and
creativity" distinguished the Key directory from the typical white-pages, whose compiler "'slavishly'"
includes every available listing.[74] The Second Circuit reversed the judgment of infringement, however, on
conventional substantial similarity grounds. The court emphasized that the defendant had duplicated only
three of Key's twenty-eight categories, had omitted 7,500 of Key's 9,000 categories, and had not duplicated
any significant groupings of listings. The court concluded as a matter of law that "the principles of selection
determining the listings"- the only "copyrightable" element of the Key directory - were not sufficiently
similar in the two works to support a finding of infringement.[75]
{49} A more recent post-Feist case that applies a minimal originality standard is Oasis Publishing Company
v. West Publishing Company, [76] the latest in a string of home-court victories for the Minnesota-based legal
publisher. In the pre-Feist case of West Publishing Company v. Mead Data Central, Inc., [77] West had
established a compilation copyright in the arrangement of cases in its National Reporter System. In Oasis, a
competitor intended to convert the decisions (but not the headnotes, synopses, or syllabi) in West's Florida
Cases to CD-ROM format.[78] Oasis planned to display parallel citations to Florida Cases at the start of each
case, and also to "star paginate" its cases - that is, to show the internal page breaks and page numbers as they
appear in Florida Cases. West claimed that both the citations and the page numbers were aspects of its
copyrighted case arrangements. West conceded that the use of parallel citations would be fair use,[79] but
insisted that Oasis's star pagination would infringe upon West's compilation copyright.[80]
{50} Mead had previously held that West's internal pagination was the expression of its copyrighted case
arrangement, and thus could not be copied by a competitor. Oasis now contended that Mead had relied on the
"sweat of the brow" doctrine, and was thus overruled by Feist, but the court rejected this contention out of
hand.[81] Tracking Mead's analysis, the court recited the acts of creativity involved in West's arranging of
cases: West first divides cases by state, then by court level; next, within each state and court level, it orders
the decisions according to whether they are opinions, memoranda, or table dispositions; finally, it orders table
dispositions alphabetically and other cases by date. The court emphasized that West's attorney-editors
frequently exercise discretion to override the system, as by taking a case out of chronological order to pair it
with a related case in the same volume.[82]
{51} Oasis attacked West's position on two fronts. First, Oasis contended that if a citation to the first page of
a case was concededly fair use, then the subsequent page numbers could not command copyright protection
because their determination was a rote process. In other words, given the first page number of a case, the
setting of the rest of the page numbers involved no creativity. The court brushed this argument aside on the
authority of Mead, holding that the arrangement process just described was sufficiently creative to merit
copyright protection, and that internal pagination was an integral part of the arrangement.[83]
{52} Oasis's second argument was closely related to the first, but was directed at infringement rather than
copyrightability. Oasis contended that internal pagination revealed nothing more about West's arrangement
than initial pagination did.[84] Therefore, if, as West conceded, it was lawful to copy initial page numbers, it
could not be infringement to copy subsequent page numbers, as well. The court was no more receptive to this
argument than it had been to the first, but its logic was obscure. The critical fact in the court's view was that
"by determining an internal page from each case in a given volume, the user could sort and determine West's
arrangement with Oasis' CD-ROM product."[85] But what about Oasis' contention that the user could do
exactly the same thing with the first-page parallel cites, which concededly were unprotected? The court's
unsatisfying response was that the publication of parallel cites would not supplant the need for West's
product, whereas the internal cites would. It is not clear why market effects are relevant to deciding whether a
given work is an infringing copy. It is even less clear why the disclosure of the nature of West's arrangement

constitutes an infringing reproduction of that arrangement.[86]
b. Insufficient originality found
{53} West Publishing has fared less well on the road. In two cases captioned Matthew Bender & Company,
Inc. v. West Publishing Company,[87] the Second Circuit denied copyright protection to many of the selection
and arrangement aspects of West's case reports. In the first Bender case, the defendant published HyperLaw, a
CD-ROM compilation of federal decisions. [88] It copied the text of the opinions from West, but deleted
West's syllabi, headnotes, and key numbers. However, HyperLaw did copy certain other enhancement
features that West adds to the judicial text: information about parties, counsel, court, and date of decision;
annotations about subsequent procedural developments; and the editing of parallel citations in the reported
cases to insure uniformity of style. West asserted that each enhancement feature reflected creative choices.
The Second Circuit disagreed, affirming the district court's grant of declaratory relief to HyperLaw. The court
held that all of the information was factual in nature, and that the information had not been compiled or
arranged with even the minimal creativity required by Feist. On the contrary, every decision that West made
about format or arrangement was dictated by convention. While West's work "entails considerable scholarly
labor and care," the court observed, "creativity in the task of creating a useful case report can only proceed in
a narrow groove."[89] In fact, a competitor seeking to produce its own reports would be hard-pressed to do
anything differently.[90]
{54} In the second case, the Second Circuit rejected claims identical to those that been endorsed in Oasis and
the earlier Mead Data decision. Here, as in those cases, the issue was whether a competing publisher could
include "star pagination" in its compilation of case reports - that is, to display the internal page numbers and
breaks that appear in West reporters.[91] West had again conceded that copying initial page numbers was fair
use. West asserted "an indirect infringement theory" to the effect that Bender's star pagination would infringe
by allowing users to perceive West's arrangement of cases, to page through them as arranged, and ultimately
to print cases exactly as published by West.[92]
{55} Explicitly repudiating both Oasis and Mead Data,[93] the Second Circuit rejected West's theory on
several grounds. First, it held that a work which simply permits a user "to rearrange the material into the
copyrightholder's arrangement" does not amount to an infringing copy - an issue never addressed in Oasis.
[94] An alternative phrasing of this conclusion is that Bender's work was not substantially similar to West's.
[95] Nor could Bender be charged with contributory infringement, because West had failed to identify any
primary infringer.[96] Finally, the court disparaged the Oasis-Mead-Data notion that a work which can
supplant the original, is by definition, a copy. Those cases, the Second Circuit held, had no basis, other than
the defunct "sweat of the brow" doctrine, for equating a "reflection" of West's arrangement with a "copy."
[97]
{56} A recent Eleventh Circuit en banc decision, Warren Publishing, Inc., v. Microdos Data Corporation,[98]
is an interesting counterpoint to the Key Publications directory case. The work at issue in Warren was the
plaintiff's Television & Cable Factbook - as the title suggests, a compilation of information about the cable
industry. In publishing its own computerized cable database, defendant Microdos allegedly copied elements
from Factbook, in particular, an extensive directory of U.S. cable systems. Warren's claim of originality in its
directory rested on what the district court called "a system for selecting communities which is unique in the
industry."[99] Rather than listing cable systems by the name of the system or the name of each community it
served (as the official Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") compilation does), Warren chose the
principal community served by each system, and listed all information under that heading. The district court
found that the selection and arrangement of the various communities was "'an obvious, mechanical, or routine
task which required no creativity.'"[100] However, it held that the underlying decision to organize by
principal community was a sufficiently creative choice to render the directory protectable.[101]

{57} The court of appeals found a fatal flaw in the lower court's use of the word "system," holding that
copyright protection for a system of selection "is contrary to the plain language of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), and is
clearly wrong."[102] Moreover, the court found, even if the system were somehow subject to protection, it
would fail the originality test, since Warren "selected" and included every cable system listed by the FCC. It
compared this - unfavorably - to the selection made in Key Publications, where "the compilation copyright
holder did not include the entire relevant universe in her directory."[103] The final nail in the coffin was the
fact that the designation of principal communities was made not by Warren, but by cable operators
responding to a survey. Even if Warren were the first to do such a survey, primacy would "not translate these
acts of discovery into acts of creation entitled to copyright protection."[104]
{58} A final variation on the originality theme is presented by Kregos v. Associated Press, [105] decided by
the Second Circuit two years after Key Publications. The work at issue in Kregos was a "pitching form," a
compilation of statistics about the starting pitchers in upcoming baseball games that is primarily of interest to
gamblers.[106] The Second Circuit's final opinion was actually the fourth reported decision in this protracted
litigation.[107] Previously, the district court had held that Kregos' form was not copyrightable as a matter of
law because it lacked sufficient originality and creativity; the court relied in part on the "blank forms"
doctrine, which has barred protection for things like check stubs. The court of appeals reversed and remanded
for reconsideration of the amount of originality and creativity present in the pitching form, holding the blank
form doctrine inapplicable because the pitching form conveyed information. On remand, the district found
sufficient originality, but held that there was no substantial similarity between Kregos' form and those used by
the defendant wire service.
{59} In affirming the finding of no infringement, the Second Circuit approached the problem from multiple
complementary angles. First, it reiterated that the pitching form was a sufficiently original work to merit
some measure of copyright protection, at least in the abstract.[108] The court then took note of the merger
doctrine, which can render meaningless the copyright in simple functional works whose ideas can be
expressed in essentially only one way.[109] Here, however, merger did not apply because "there are a variety
of selections Kregos could have chosen for his form." [110] Comparing the plaintiff's and defendant's forms,
the court observed that six of the ten statistics presented on the two forms were identical. However, it
concluded, much of the overlap was influenced by the common purpose of the two forms - a weak version of
the merger doctrine that it had just rejected. In light of this rationale, the defendant's selection of four
different statistical categories was enough to avoid a finding of substantial similarity.[111]
{60} The principal relevance of Kregos to database protection is its emphasis on the potential role of
functional constraints. Think of Kregos' pitching form as a very simple statistical database. Its selection of
data was sufficiently creative to yield a nominal copyright. That copyright was robust enough to survive an
abstract legal challenge. Yet it had no practical value for its owner because it could not support a finding of
substantial similarity: those similarities that were observed were written off to function, while even minimal
differences were enough to avoid substantiality.
c. Conclusions for databases
{61} The post-Feist compilation cases prompt several inferences about the copyright status of databases:
*Feist has raised the originality bar. The standard may be minimal, but it is a standard, nonetheless. Courts
are no longer free to ignore the originality requirement, or to substitute "sweat of the brow."
*We still know very little about the principles to be applied to computerized databases. Feist itself, of course,
involved the most primitive sort of paper database, a telephone book. In some of the other cases (e.g, Warren
and the West cases), at least one of the competing works was in digital form. However, the courts treated even
these works as if they were simply alternative versions of such familiar paper compilations as case reporters

and directories. Thus, when we speculate about the legal fate of things like Internet databases accessed with
powerful search engines, we should remember how little we actually know at this point.
*The more comprehensive the database, the less copyright protection may be available. The keys to
protection are selection and arrangement. As the Warren cable directory case reminds us, if everything is
included, then there is no selection. The existence and depth of any copyright will rest entirely on the
originality of the arrangement. This principle may be especially problematic for digital databases such as
those accessed through the Internet, since their very appeal is their all-inclusiveness.
*The form of the selection and arrangement must be original to the database creator and separable from the
dictates of function. As several of the post-Feist cases illustrate, it is fatal to copyright if the selection and
arrangement either (1) follow principles already developed, or (2) are constrained by function. "Function" can
mean a variety of things, including established convention (the alphabetical listings in Feist itself), the
demands of the user market (the pitching forms in Kregos), or the data themselves (the attorney and court
information in the West cases). The merger doctrine is a variation on this theme, applicable when the
underlying idea is capable of only a narrow range of expression. These also may be particularly difficult
issues for Internet databases, given the rapid growth of search conventions and the need of database creators
to satisfy mass user audiences.
4. Search and Organization Tools
{62} The tools for searching and organizing data enjoy the same level of protection as other computer
programs. The scope of and limitations on software copyrights are massive topics well beyond the scope of
this article. Although individual cases continue to pose difficult questions of application, there is now a
general consensus about the applicable legal principles, as a result of the near-universal acceptance of the
"abstraction-filtration-comparison" test promulgated by the Second Circuit in Computer Associates
International., Inc. v. Altai, Inc.[112] In addition, the Federal Circuit's recent decision in State Street Bank &
Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.[113] appears to have eliminated any doubt that software-based
processes and systems comprise patentable subject matter as long as they manipulate data for some useful
purpose. Indeed, State Street all-but invites claims in the form of "a data processing system for [doing almost
anything useful]."[114] Thus, information systems whose value lies primarily in their search and organization
tools will find protection under the well-established principles of both copyright and patent law.
5. Technical Measures and the Digital Millenium Copyright Act[115]
{63} The Digital Millenium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), a massive piece of legislation enacted in October
1998, may have a significant if unintended impact on the protection of databases. The relevant portion of the
DMCA implements the 1996 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty by adding to the
Copyright Act a new Chapter 12 entitled "Copyright Protection and Management Systems."[116] Subject to a
number of exceptions, it is now a copyright offense to "circumvent a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under [Title 17]," or to manufacture, sell, or traffic in products whose only
significant purpose is circumvention.[117] The new chapter provides a full range of civil remedies and
criminal penalties.[118]
{64} As a result of Chapter 12, technological protections for copyrighted works, formerly referred to as "nonlegal," are transformed into legal protections as well. A logical question is whether the DMCA has effectively
closed all remaining gaps in the wall of legal protection for digital databases. The argument that it has is
simple: regardless of the scope of copyright or other existing protection, the proprietor of a database can
achieve fool-proof protection by employing technical barriers to unauthorized copying. If the barriers work,
there will be no unauthorized copying; if they fail and are circumvented, the act of circumvention will itself
violate the Copyright Act.

{65} As superficially appealing as it may be, this reasoning has several possible flaws. The first problem is
that, for reasons discussed earlier, some database proprietors will not want to use technological measures.
[119] Many proprietors tolerate or even encourage small-scale copying by ordinary users; their only concern
is massive appropriation and remarketing of their data by competitors.
{66} The second problem involves the legal meaning of the phrase "a work protected under this title." If the
DMCA is to fill in the gaps in existing copyright protection, then this phrase must be interpreted to mean "a
work falling generally within the subject matter of copyright." If this is the meaning, then circumventing a
measure designed to protect a database - a compilation, clearly within the subject matter of copyright - would
be illegal, regardless of how thin that copyright might prove to be. A court hearing a Chapter 12 case would
never reach the sort of issues that have been dispositive in the post-Feist cases.
{67} It is also possible to interpret the phrase to mean "a work protected under this title, but only to the extent
of such protection." Under this interpretation, a court in a Chapter 12 case would first have to determine the
extent of the traditional copyright protection in the work in question. Circumventing technological measures
would then be illegal only to the extent that those measures protected copyrightable expression. It would not
violate Chapter 12, for example, to circumvent measures protecting unoriginal arrangements of raw facts, as
in Feist itself. If this were the proper interpretation, then Chapter 12 would do little more than add a new
remedy to existing copyright law.
{68} As a matter of common sense, the latter reading seems strained. The more straightforward approach is
to take "work protected under this chapter" as inviting a general consideration of the nature of the work, not
full-blown copyright litigation. Nonetheless, the question of interpretation will remain open unless and until
authoritatively answered by the courts.
{69} A final potential issue is a species of the "gray market" problem. That is, what happens if a
technological protection for a database is disabled abroad? Can the database then be freely used outside of the
United States, or even imported back into this country? The answer to both questions is certainly "no." First,
recall that the DMCA technological measures legislation was intended to implement a WIPO treaty. This
means that most other countries will have similar legislation in place, and will offer reciprocal national
treatment to authors from other signatory countries.[120] In addition, the U.S. Copyright Act already
prohibits the importation, without authority of the copyright holder, of any copies of a protected work that
have been acquired outside the United States.[121] A separate provision forbids the importation of copies
made under circumstances that would have constituted an infringement if U.S. law had applied.[122]
B. The Perceived Shortcomings in U.S. Law
{70} Each of the past two United States Congresses has seen a failed attempt to create non-copyright, sui
generis protection for databases more or less on the European Union model. [123] Comparable legislation is
pending in the current Congress.[124] This activity reflects a perception that is widespread, at least among the
proprietors of information systems, that the current level of protection is inadequate.[125] Among the
principal concerns are the following, each of which has been identified in the legal discussion above.
1. Post-Feist copyright protection is too "thin." Although the Feist standard is low, it is working to eliminate
or at least vitiate protection for many databases that are the product of substantial "sweat" (and investment),
but little creativity. Moreover, even when copyright protection does exist in theory, it is often nominal in
application.
2. Unfair competition and misappropriation remedies are likely to face preemption. To survive, such remedies
cannot be merely "copyright lite" causes of action, but must include extra elements such as time-sensitivity of
the data or free-riding. However, what many database proprietors really want is precisely what the

preemption doctrine forbids: a simple prohibition against copying compilations that are insufficiently original
for copyright purposes. In addition, even those state-law protections that do survive are too spotty and
inconsistent to be relied upon in a global marketing environment like the Internet.
3. Contract protection is often infeasible, both practically and legally. For many database proprietors, it will
be impossible to obtain assent to restrictive contracts, or inconsistent with their business objectives.
Notwithstanding some recent positive developments, there are still lingering questions about the
enforceability of "click-on" licenses, and even contract law faces possible preemption problems.

V. The Available Legal Options
{71} Those in the database industry who take these concerns seriously have been promoting a European-style
solution for the last several years. The key element is a non-copyright, sui generis form of protection. In this
section we review the European approach, and then describe the ongoing effort to enact such legislation in
the U.S. Congress.
A. The European Response
{72} In 1996, the European Union ("EU") enacted a Directive (the "Database Directive")[126] for the
purpose of bringing more uniformity to the protection of databases within the EU, while ensuring that there
would be a level of protection adequate to encourage their continued creation. [127] Each member state was
required to enact a law consistent with the Database Directive by 1998.[128]
{73} The Database Directive limited the availability of copyright protection for databases,[129] and to fill the
gap resulting from that limitation, created a new sui generis right protecting the makers of databases.[130]
The Database Directive specifically provided that the existing Directive on the protection of computer
programs (the "Software Directive")[131] would continue to specify the appropriate level of copyright
protection for search engines and related software tools.[132] The Database Directive made no change in
either trade secret or patent law. The remainder of this section describes in more detail the current level of
database protection in the EU.
1. Copyright Protection
{74} Prior to the enactment of the Database Directive, the scope of copyright protection for databases varied
significantly from country to country. The United Kingdom and Ireland had very low originality requirements
and routinely protected works with minimal creativity,[133] such as the telephone directory at issue in Feist.
The rest of the EU countries were more focused on the level of the author's original creative work, and
generally did not provide copyright protection for a work, like a telephone directory, that had minimal
originality.[134]
{75} The Database Directive rejected the approach being used in the United Kingdom and Ireland and raised
the threshold for copyright protection by specifying that there would be no copyright protection unless "by
reason of the selection or arrangement of the contents of the database, the database constitutes the author's
own intellectual creation."[135] This standard is very similar to the standard that is applied in the United
States after Feist[136] with one additional limitation: under the Database Directive, there must be intellectual
creation by a human author[137] for copyright protection to exist, raising questions about the extent to which
a database can be protected under copyright law if the selection and arrangement of data is accomplished by a
computer program with minimal human contribution.

{76} As a result of the Software Directive, copyright law in the EU will continue to provide meaningful
protection for software, so it will remain important in the protection of search tools. However, in the case of
most databases, it seems unlikely that the compilation itself will exhibit the type of intellectual creation
required for copyright protection. Thus, as a result of the Database Directive, copyright law is likely to play a
less significant role in the protection of databases.
2. Trade Secret Protection
{77} EU law does not deal in a uniform manner with the protection of commercial trade secrets. [138]
Rather, each member state retains its own laws in this area. While the laws vary to some extent, most
countries provide some type of civil and criminal protection against the misappropriation of confidential
commercial information, whether by breach of a contract or other wrongful conduct.[139] The Database
Directive specifically provides for the survival of national laws concerning, among other things, trade secret
rights in the data elements contained in a database.[140] With respect to electronic databases in which the
access to data is restricted by technical means, the EU is in the process of adopting a directive that will
prohibit the circumvention of technical protections in the same manner as the U.S. Digital Millenium
Copyright Act.[141] This new provision, working in concert with existing national trade secret law, should be
broad enough to protect against most kinds of "data dumps." Trade secret law should also provide at least
some protection against the misuse of confidential information relating to the manner in which the data in a
database has been selected, verified and arranged. Thus, trade secret law in the EU can provide partial, but
often very useful, protection for databases.
3. Patent Protection
{78} Article 52(2) of the European Patent Convention [142] provides that "programs for computers" are not
to be regarded as patentable "inventions." In practice, patents have been routinely granted for software-based
inventions under conditions similar to those obtained in the United States prior to the State Street decision.
[143] "Thus inventions for a technical process which are implemented by a computer program are considered
patentable, providing the claims are directed to method steps performed by the program, or to a computer
system including both hardware and the computer program."[144] Claims directed to the program itself are
unpatentable. [145] Since a patent claim on a typical database -- an unlikely prospect in any event -- would be
more likely to fall into the latter category than the former, patent law is not currently a realistic source of
database protection in the EU. At least one practitioner has argued that European law can and should be
modified in a manner consistent with State Street,[146] so it is possible the patent law will play at least some
role in database protection in the EU in the future.
4. The New Sui Generis Right
{79} The Database Directive created a new sui generis right [147] that protects the economic investment of
the "maker" of a database by prohibiting third parties from extracting or re-utilizing the contents of the
database without the consent of the maker. The right is subject to certain exceptions that resemble, but are
narrower than the fair use exceptions under copyright law. The sui generis right supplements, but does not
replace copyright protection.
{80} The "maker" of a database is the individual or company who takes the initiative in creating the database
and who assumes the financial risk. [148] The maker may be different from the "author" of the database, so
different persons or companies may hold the copyright and the sui generis right in a particular database. [149]
To qualify for protection under the sui generis right, the maker must have made a substantial investment in
"the obtaining, verification or presentation" of the data. [150] In the case of an individual, he or she must be a
national or resident of one of the member states of the EU. [151] A company will qualify if (1) it is created
under the laws of one of the member states and has a substantial presence in a member state, or (2) it has a

registered office within the EU and "its operations [are] genuinely linked on an ongoing basis with the
economy of a Member State." [152] This latter provision is clearly biased against smaller companies in the
U.S. and other non-EU countries, since, even if they do establish an EU office, they are less likely than their
multinational counterparts to be able to show ongoing economic linkage.
{81} Not every compilation of information will be considered a "database" for the purpose of the sui generis
right. To qualify for protection, a database must be "a collection of independent works, data or other materials
arranged in a systematic or methodical way, and individually accessible by electronic or other means."[153]
The requirement of independence is intended to exclude works such as a film, which literally is composed of
a collection of still frames, but in which the still frames are not independent of each other. [154]
{82} The requirement that the data be "arranged" does not specify any physical storage arrangement, [155]
and it should be sufficient that specific attributes be assigned to each item of data. It should be enough, for
example, for data to be organized into fields, or for facts to be assigned to tables which are then related by
rules. However, the requirement of arrangement would presumably exclude protection for a database that is
no more than an unorganized compilation of data that can be searched and retrieved by a search engine.
{83} If a database qualifies for the sui generis protection, no third party will have the right to extract or
reutilize "all or a substantial part" [156] of the contents of the database for a fifteen year period. [157] This
right is much broader than it would at first appear, since the Database Directive expressly provides that the
repeated and systematic extraction or re-utilization of insubstantial parts of a database may amount to the
extraction or re-utilization of a substantial part. [158] This is an important distinction, since the typical use of
a database involves this very type of access. Each member state is free to determine its remedies for the
infringement of the sui generis right.[159]
{84} The sui generis right is not absolute. A maker of a database that is made available to the public cannot
prevent a lawful user of the database from extracting or re-utilizing insubstantial parts of it. [160] In addition,
the sui generis right is subject to certain exceptions for non-commercial uses related to teaching, scientific
research, and public security.[161] These exceptions are narrower than the similar fair use exceptions under
copyright law. [162] For example, the sui generis right has no exceptions for criticism, news reporting, satire,
or library use.
5. The Impact of the Privacy Directive
{85} The underlying premise of the Database Directive is the notion that the development of databases
should be encouraged because they are an essential tool in the development of an information market. [163]
The Database Directive seeks to provide a level of protection that will be adequate to encourage the financial
investment and risk inherent in the creation of databases. However, any assessment of the adequacy of
database protection in the EU must take into account the provisions of the Directive on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Movement of Such Data[164] (the
"Privacy Directive"). The Privacy Directive established a fundamental individual right of privacy that is far
broader than any comparable notion in the United States. Each member state was required to adopt a law
prior to October 28, 1998 that established a national regulatory body for the protection of personal data,[165]
required the prior consent of an individual for the collection and use of personal data,[166] required
disclosure to the individual of the purposes for which the data was being collected,[167] and prohibited the
transmittal of personal data to other countries that lack "adequate laws" for the protection of personal data.
[168] The United States is presumably in danger of being so categorized, with unrealized consequences that
are still difficult to predict. [169]
{86} Taken together, the provisions of the Privacy Directive may significantly increase the costs of creating
and maintaining databases in the EU while decreasing their usefulness, with the net effect of raising the level

of protection that a business may demand before investing the time and money required to create one. It is too
early to tell whether the EU has struck an appropriate balance between creating economic incentives for the
creation of databases and protecting the privacy of individuals.
B. The U.S. Legislative Response
{87} In this country, the database industry's first major initiative was the Database Investment and
Intellectual Property Antipiracy Act of 1996, introduced in the 104th Congress in the spring of 1996 as H.R.
3531. The bill proposed a sui generis database right essentially on the European model.[170] However, it
went beyond the EU Database Directive by establishing a twenty-five year (versus fifteen) term of protection
and by giving database proprietors a broader right of exclusion. Whereas, the EU Database Directive
prohibits only extraction and reuse of data, H.R. 3531 would have limited any use - even certain uses of
insubtantial portions of the protected database - that might affect the proprietor's market or conflict with the
owner's normal exploitation of the data. The bill also lacked a fair use or public interest exception. Largely
because of the latter shortcoming, it was attacked by the scientific and academic communities as portending
the monopolization of pure knowledge. H.R. 3531 died in the House Judiciary Committee.[171]
{88} Two major initiatives, each less expansive than H.R. 3531, were launched during the 1997-98
Congressional session. The Information Technology Association of America ("ITAA"), an Arlington,
Virginia-based trade association, argued for legislation based on state laws of misappropriation.[172] The
ITAA proposal would have created a cause of action in favor of a database producer against a person who
made unauthorized use of information generated by a substantial investment of time or money, if the use
competed directly with the producer's authorized products and served as a disincentive to the creation of such
products.
{89} The second approach was that taken by H.R. 2652, introduced in October 1997 by Rep. Howard Coble
(R-N.C.).[173] H.R. 2652 was considerably more aggressive in its protection than the ITAA proposal. Like
the previous year's H.R. 3531, H.R. 2652 followed the EU model in broadly prohibiting the use of "all or a
substantial part of a collection of information gathered, organized, or maintained by another person through
the investment of substantial monetary or other resources, so as to harm that other person's actual or potential
market for a product or service."[174] H.R. 2652 departed from the EU model in imposing no time limit on
the protection. However, unlike its predecessor, the 1997 bill enumerated a number of "permitted acts,"
including the extraction or use of individual items of information or insubstantial parts of a protected
collection, or using protected information for purposes of verifying independently gathered data, conducting
non-profit research in a manner that does not hurt the actual or potential market for the database, or reporting
the news.[175] Notwithstanding these limitations, H.R. 2652 was the subject of a protracted lobbying
struggle between the database industry, and academic and scientific communities.[176] Among the specific
concerns of the latter group were the absence of a time limit, the ambiguous phrase "collection of
information," which could extend to bodies of knowledge well beyond the conventional definition of a
database, and the limitation of the research exemption to uses that do not threaten the market for the protected
database. Along these lines, of particular concern was the argument that any injection of information into the
public domain would be viewed as a threat to the market for a proprietary database. Although the bill seemed
to have been drafted almost entirely from the proprietors' perspective, both sides were dissatisfied with the
indeterminacy of the phrase "substantial part." The Justice Department also entered the dispute with questions
about the constitutionality of the bill.[177]
{90} The House passed H.R. 2652 in May 1998, and then passed it again as part of the House version of
what was to become the Digital Millenium Copyright Act. However, the Senate deleted the provisions of
H.R. 2652 from the DMCA before both houses passed that legislation in October 1998. While this was going
on, Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) attempted to reach a compromise between industry and research interests,
but his efforts proved unavailing.[178]

{91} Rep. Coble, Sen. Hatch, and the ITAA all promised renewed efforts in the 106th Congress. On January
19, 1999, Rep. Coble introduced a new Collections of Information Antipiracy Act ("CIAA") as H.R. 354. The
bill is almost identical to the failed H.R. 2652, with two potentially significant diffferences: H.R. 345 includes
a fair use exemption[179] and limits protection to a period of fifteen years after the misappropriated portion
of the database was first offered in commerce.[180] An ITAA representative has indicated that its proposal
will move from a misappropriation to an unfair competition model.[181] The organization's bill will protect
"databases" rather than "collections of information," and the cause of action will require a showing of both
duplication and competition in commerce leading to commercial harm.[182] Although Sen. Hatch has not yet
introduced legislation, he has read into the Congressional Record three illustrative bills: his final 1998
compromise draft, the new Coble proposal, and a bill on the unfair competition model that fits the ITAA
description.[183] As we conclude this article, the only formal action on any new legislation has been the
approval of H.R. 354 by the House Judiciary Committee.[184]

VI. Conclusions: What Should We Do?
{92} Before launching into recommendations for legal action, it may be beneficial to take a step back and ask
the prior question of what our policy objective is. Presumably, it is to advance the constitutional goal of
promoting the progress of science and the useful arts through the granting of exclusive rights. In our
particular context, that means to use legal exclusivity to promote the creation of databases, especially those
that are in some sense the most "useful." But, the constitution also emphasizes that exclusivity must be
employed in a limited way, giving away no more of the public domain than is necessary to achieve the
desired promotional effect.
{93} Arriving at a perfect utilitarian balance between incentives for knowledge producers and access for
knowledge consumers has always been the Holy Grail of intellectual property law. Just like the original Holy
Grail, this one is still at large, of course. This is due in substantial part to the lack of a clear distinction
between producers and consumers. Since few if any producers start from scratch, the process of knowledge
production inevitably begins with the consumption of what is already there. This reality is sometimes
conveniently overlooked by the database industry and its advocates. Their position is a variation on the pullup-the-drawbridge argument made by opponents of suburban growth: now that I'm comfortably ensconced in
my subdivision, development has to stop. The database version is: I may have stood on the shoulders of those
who came before, but no one is going to stand on mine.[185] While this form of argument may occasionally
make sense in the development context, it has no place in the world of knowledge production.
{94} With this as background, we turn to four questions that frame the dilemma facing lawmakers:
{95} 1. Is the current law really inadequate? As we have discussed, those who argue for new federal
legislation allege numerous inadequacies in the current law.[186] But the adequacy of current law cannot be
judged in the abstract. It depends, rather, on what kind of database one is talking about, and how it will be
used. It is important to remember that the claims of inadequacy derive from Feist and its heightened standard
for protection. Feist, however, focused on wholesale copying of the most vulnerable kind of database, a paper
telephone book. Most of the subsequent cases that have found little or no copyright protection have dealt with
comparable compilations, or straightforward digital copies thereof.[187]
{96} To evaluate the adequacy of existing legal protections for compilations of data, it is necessary to
consider three distinct scenarios. In the first, the database consists of an unoriginal compilation on the phone
book model, and the users seek unrestricted access to the entirety of the information. The second scenario
involves the "full service" database, where the proprietor both collects, arranges, and manages the raw data
and provides the search tools. The user does not take possession of (or have disclosed to him) the entirety of

the database, as in the phone book model, but is granted controlled access in order to create some subset of
information. The Lexis/Nexis and Westlaw legal databases are examples. The third scenario is illustrated by
the typical Internet search. The user brings to bear search and organization tools from one or more sources in
order to access an unlimited range of data sources and create a compilation customized to fit his own needs.
{97} The second situation is the easiest to evaluate from a legal perspective. Here, existing protections seem
adequate. There is a measure of real exclusivity, to which the law makes significant enhancements. Technical
measures are readily available to deny access or impose conditions, thereby diminishing the likelihood of
wholesale theft of the database. Since access is understood to be limited from the outset, there is little market
resistance to such measures. Moreover, where the raw data are themselves proprietary, the availability of
technical restrictions makes trade secret protection of the database both legally and practically feasible, thus
dodging the whole preemption problem.[188] Even some level of copyright protection may be available for
the raw data if their selection and arrangement involve a modicum of creativity.[189] In addition, the
circumvention of technical measures is now itself a copyright infringement.[190] Search and organization
tools are subject to copyright and, increasingly, patent protection. On balance, neither a European-style sui
generis right, nor a national misappropriation or unfair competition law would seem to add significantly to
what is already available to database producers in this category of circumstances.
{98} The third scenario is conceptually similar to the second, but with the added wrinkle that there are now a
plurality (if not an infinity) of data sources. The conclusions reached above concerning search and
organization tools apply here as well. Some of the data sources may be suitable for technical protection
and/or merit a meaningful level of copyright, contract, or trade secret protection. But many-perhaps most -will not. Some will lack the market appeal to support any kind of restrictions;[191] others, by their nature,
will not command a meaningful level of intellectual property protection; many will have both sets of
problems. Further, the management of the whole situation is complicated, of course, by the multiplicity of
players. Consequently, for those who expose more or less raw and non-proprietary data to Internet searches,
both real and artificial exclusivity are absent and a sui generis right would add significantly to their ability to
control usage.
{99} The first scenario -- the phonebook-type database made available for unrestricted use -- is the most
difficult. There is substantial market demand for simple compilations, particularly if the compiler has had to
expend "sweat" by mining the data from other sources. Users of raw data are likely to be resistant to
technological measures. If I have to do the work of selection and collation, I probably will not accept
significant technical impediments; I am likely to decide fairly quickly to forgo purchase of the database and
collect the information myself. Even here, however, if the subject data have been "mined," there may be
enough originality to generate significant copyright protection. Contractual arrangements may also be
feasible in some situations, subject to the vagaries of preemption. But, in the true Feist case and its
corollaries, involving complete access to phonebooks and other primitive compilations, the "goods" are
plainly non-exclusive, and current law offers little help. Any form of sui generis right would significantly
alter the present legal landscape.
{100} 2. Assuming that we can enhance protection for simple databases, should we? To address this
question, it is useful to ask how the market would respond if the law did nothing further to promote database
exclusivity. The current law is not inert, but is clearly discriminatory. It encourages reliance on search tools
and sophisticated (creative, and thus original) data mining techniques while discouraging the production and
sale of bulk databases.
{101} Is this a good or a bad thing? The word "discrimination" has negative connotations, but not all
discrimination is invidious. In our semi-free-market system, certain classes of producers are regularly
disadvantaged by the law's failure to intervene on their behalf. For example, the current law offers no
encouragement to the production of ideas that are not transformed into a operable invention or a copyrighted

work. One who submits a raw idea to industry for possible exploitation has little to rely on beyond the good
faith of the recipient.[192] But this is not widely viewed as problematic; on the contrary, it is assumed that
unrefined ideas have insufficient social utility to be worth the law's intervention.[193]
{102} The database issue requires a similar kind of analysis. Thus, we might ask whether the Feist end of the
database industry is producing something of such value to society that the law should lend artificial
exclusivity to the product. To take a specific instance, would it be a good or bad thing if most directories were
provided on a diskette together with a search program (the whole entity having a meaningful mix of
copyright, contract, and even patent protection), rather than in written form? Would this make society more
efficient? Or, would it magnify the gap between the haves, who could afford and utilize the more
sophisticated database, and the have-nots, who might lose access to the information in any form? Before
jumping to any conclusions, recall that library catalogs have undergone this very transformation, with adverse
consequences only for irredeemable luddites.
{103} A related issue is whether the proprietors of Feist-type databases actually need enhanced protection.
Despite the arguments of Senator Hatch and others,[194] we see no evidence that a raw information shortage
is developing. On the contrary, experience says that all of us are overwhelmed by information, and its
proliferation is accelerating. The evidence suggests that proprietors are finding alternative avenues to
profitability (that is, through means other than exclusivity);[195] advertising is currently the most important
of these. Moreover, technical measures improve daily, offering the hope for subtler compromises between the
free access that attracts advertisers and the wholesale misappropriation that frightens producers. As Feist
itself suggests, it is dangerous to predicate tomorrow's law on yesterday's - or even today's - technology.
{104} Our conclusion is that the problem of inadequate protection, however serious in the abstract, is, in the
real world of digital property, (1) limited in scope and (2) having little discernible effect on the pace of the
digital revolution. At most, some kinds of low-end databases can legitimately claim inadequate legal
protection. In addition, any restrictions on access to information have real social costs, a topic we explore
further below. We are therefore hesitant to advocate novel and broadly applicable sui generis legislation.
{105} 3. If we nonetheless conclude that we do want to protect all types of databases, what form should the
protection take? The form of protection has two components: the nature of what is to be protected and the
conduct that is to be prohibited. With respect to the first, there seems to be no realistic alternative to the
European model of predicating protection on the investment of substantial time or money in the compilation
effort[196]-sweat of the brow, in other words. It has never been seriously proposed that information itself
should be protected (except under trade secret law), and the compilations seeking protection are by definition
unoriginal. Sweat equity is all that is left.
{106} The second component is more complex. The European prohibitions are very broad, covering
"extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or a substantial part" of the database,[197] subject to some fair
use-type exceptions.[198] But this approach conflates two categories of misappropriation that should be kept
separate. The first is the individual who wants to use data for personal purposes without paying for it. (The
European Database Directive exempts some, but by no means all, personal uses.[199]) This is roughly
comparable to a home user who copies a friend's software. Experience has shown that the law is of limited
value in limiting this risk. Legal protection would be of largely theoretical value, and the owner of the
database should therefore be left to fight this battle by other, technical means. Even in cases where no such
alternatives are available, the law ought not to invest its credibility and resources in this ultimately futile
endeavor. Software producers have, after all, survived the home copying problem.It is commercial
misappropriation that should be the focus of any legislation. This focus might be achieved either through a
European-style sui generis right with a blanket exemption for non-commercial use or a federal law of unfair
competition that required a showing of actual or intended commercial advantage.[200] If the sui generis right
is limited by a broad non-commercial exemption, there seems little to choose between the two.[201] With

either, the principal point of contention is likely to be the meaning of "commercial." It is easy to foresee such
disputes as whether the copying of a database by research scientists at a drug company is a forbidden
commercial use or a protected research use. Its immediate purpose may be purely scientific, but the ultimate
objective of the whole endeavor is to generate profits. A related question would involve research in a
university laboratory which produces patentable inventions that generate revenue to further the university's
non-profit mission. Copyright cases that have attempted to apply the fair use doctrine in contexts just like
these hint at the difficulties to be expected.[202]
{107} A final consideration is the general advisability of following a novel European Union approach. One
reaction might be that if the whole continent of Europe has adopted the sui generis approach then it must be
sensible. But recall that the Database Directive was adopted in early 1996, when the Internet was in its
relative infancy. For European nations adopting conforming legislation, the basic policy questions we have
been discussing were already moot. Is there any indication that the U.S. database industry has suffered
relative to its EU counterpart in the three-plus years since the Directive was promulgated?
{108} Remember also that EU legislation is sometimes enacted to advance agendas beyond its nominal
subject matter. For one thing, in a Europe that is federalizing self-consciously and often awkwardly, the very
adoption of a continent-wide legal regime can be viewed as a worthy accomplishment. The United States,
whatever its other problems, does not suffer from a paucity of federal law. Note as well that the Database
Directive works in concert with the Privacy Directive[203] to provide a level of central control over the
digital industry that goes far beyond anything ever advanced in this country. This control reflects a very
different relationship among government, citizens, and private businesses than has been customary in the
United States, and a very different experience with government monitoring of individuals.[204] Finally, a
cynic might suggest that every EU initiative must be searched for hidden protectionism.[205]
{109} None of this is to say that the European solution is wrong. It has, however, emerged in a different
political and cultural context. Consequently, the United States Congress should be reluctant to adopt
European policy assumptions without questioning them at a fundamental level.
{110} Overall, it is our judgment that new legislation is neither necessary nor desirable. With respect to
necessity, the information industry is growing explosively under the present dispensation. To the extent that
certain segments of the industry are disfavored by current law and technology, they are segments that
economic Darwinism has probably already doomed to extinction. Moreover, the pace of technological change
is such that any "novel" legislation might be obsolete before it took effect. With respect to desirability, it
should be emphasized that relatively free access to information has been a cornerstone of the digital
revolution. To threaten this growth with novel and aggressive restrictions on access would be risky indeed;
this is not, after all, a situation where a dying industry is desperate to be saved. In more technical terms, all
the evidence suggests it ain't broke, so don't fix it.
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